Philosophy Colloquium: "On Responsibility for Untoward Inadvertent Action" with Michael McKenna (UofA)

The Philosophy Colloquium is presented by the philosophy faculty in the School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies. 

For future dates, visit: shprs.asu.edu/philosophy-colloquia

About the Speaker 

Abstract: Inadvertence poses a problem for theories of moral responsibility. Assuming that a person is blameworthy for what she does only if she does so from an objectionable quality of will, it seems to follow that in some case agents are not responsible for their inadvertence. Yet holding people responsible for their mistakes is widespread. The person who accidentally spills their red wine on your white couch is responsible for doing so even if they act from no objectionable quality of will. Moreover, they often hold themselves responsible, blame themselves, feel badly about what they have done, and so on. I argue that we can explain such cases by distinguishing between responsibility for conduct for which one is either praiseworthy or blameworthy, and responsibility for conduct for which one is neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy. These agents are responsible for their inadvertence, but they are not blameworthy. This explains why they should take responsibility for their inadvertence. It also helps to identify the fitting reactive attitudes in response to being responsible in these sorts of cases.